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Abstract18
We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE) in weighted atomic conges-19
tion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d. Previously it was known that20
d-approximate equilibria always exist, while nonexistence was established only for small constants,21
namely for 1.153-PNE. We improve significantly upon this gap, proving that such games in general22
do not have Θ˜(
√
d)-approximate PNE, which provides the first super-constant lower bound.23
Furthermore, we provide a black-box gap-introducing method of combining such nonexistence24
results with a specific circuit gadget, in order to derive NP-completeness of the decision version25
of the problem. In particular, deploying this technique we are able to show that deciding whether26
a weighted congestion game has an O˜(
√
d)-PNE is NP-complete. Previous hardness results were27
known only for the special case of exact equilibria and arbitrary cost functions.28
The circuit gadget is of independent interest and it allows us to also prove hardness for a variety29
of problems related to the complexity of PNE in congestion games. For example, we demonstrate30
that the question of existence of α-PNE in which a certain set of players plays a specific strategy31
profile is NP-hard for any α < 3d/2, even for unweighted congestion games.32
Finally, we study the existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games with33
general (nondecreasing) costs, as a function of the number of players n. We show that n-PNE always34
exist, matched by an almost tight nonexistence bound of Θ˜(n) which we can again transform into35
an NP-completeness proof for the decision problem.36
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1 Introduction51
Congestion games constitute the standard framework to study settings where selfish players52
compete over common resources. They are one of the most well-studied classes of games53
within the field of algorithmic game theory [32, 27], covering a wide range of applications,54
including, e.g., traffic routing and load balancing. In their most general form, each player55
has her own weight and the latency on each resource is a nondecreasing function of the total56
weight of players that occupy it. The cost of a player on a given outcome is just the total57
latency that she is experiencing, summed over all the resources she is using.58
The canonical approach to analysing such systems and predicting the behaviour of the59
participants is the ubiquitous game-theoretic tool of equilibrium analysis. More specifically, we60
are interested in the pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of those games; these are stable configurations61
from which no player would benefit from unilaterally deviating. However, it is a well-known62
fact that such desirable outcomes might not always exist, even in very simple weighted63
congestion games. A natural response, especially from a computer science perspective, is to64
relax the solution notion itself by considering approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE);65
these are states from which, even if a player could improve her cost by deviating, this66
improvement could not be by more than a (multiplicative) factor of α ≥ 1. Allowing the67
parameter α to grow sufficiently large, existence of α-PNE is restored. But how large does α68
really need to be? And, perhaps more importantly from a computational perspective, how69
hard is it to check whether a specific game has indeed an α-PNE?70
1.1 Related Work71
The origins of the systematic study of (atomic) congestion games can be traced back to the72
influential work of Rosenthal [30, 31]. Although Rosenthal showed the existence of congestion73
games without PNE, he also proved that unweighted congestion games always possess such74
equilibria. His proof is based on a simple but ingenious potential function argument, which75
up to this day is essentially still the only general tool for establishing existence of pure76
equilibria.77
In follow-up work [20, 26, 17], the nonexistence of PNE was demonstrated even for special78
simple classes of (weighted) games, including network congestion games with quadratic cost79
functions and games where the player weights are either 1 or 2. On the other hand, we know80
that equilibria do exist for affine or exponential latencies [17, 28, 22], as well as for the class81
of singleton1 games [16, 23]. Dunkel and Schulz [13] were able to extend the nonexistence82
instance of Fotakis et al. [17] to a gadget in order to show that deciding whether a congestion83
game with step cost functions has a PNE is a (strongly) NP-hard problem, via a reduction84
from 3-Partition.85
Regarding approximate equilibria, Hansknecht et al. [21] gave instances of very simple,86
two-player polynomial congestion games that do not have α-PNE, for α ≈ 1.153. This87
1 These are congestion games where the players can only occupy single resources.
G. Christodoulou, M. Gairing, Y. Giannakopoulos, D. Poças, and C. Waldmann 32:3
lower bound is achieved by numerically solving an optimization program, using polynomial88
latencies of maximum degree d = 4. On the positive side, Caragiannis et al. [4] proved that89
d!-PNE always exist; this upper bound on the existence of α-PNE was later improved to90
α = d+ 1 [21, 9] and α = d [3].91
1.2 Our Results and Techniques92
After formalizing our model in Section 2, in Section 3 we show the nonexistence of Θ(
√
d
ln d )-93
approximate equilibria for polynomial congestion games of degree d. This is the first94
super-constant lower bound on the nonexistence of α-PNE, significantly improving upon the95
previous constant of α ≈ 1.153 and reducing the gap with the currently best upper bound96
of d. More specifically (Theorem 1), for any integer d we construct congestion games with97
polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d (and nonnegative coefficients) that do not98
have α-PNE, for any α < α(d) where α(d) is a function that grows as α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. To99
derive this bound, we had to use a novel construction with a number of players growing100
unboundedly as a function of d.101
Next, in Section 4 we turn our attention to computational hardness constructions.102
Starting from a Boolean circuit, we create a gadget that transfers hard instances of the103
classic Circuit Satisfiability problem to (even unweighted) polynomial congestion games.104
Our construction is inspired by the work of Skopalik and Vöcking [34], who used a similar105
family of lockable circuit games in their PLS-hardness result. Using this gadget we can106
immediately establish computational hardness for various computational questions of interest107
involving congestion games (Theorem 3). For example, we show that deciding whether a108
d-degree polynomial congestion game has an α-PNE in which a specific set of players play a109
specific strategy profile is NP-hard, even up to exponentially-approximate equilibria; more110
specifically, the hardness holds for any α < 3d/2. Our investigation of the hardness questions111
presented in Theorem 3 (and later on in Corollary 7 as well) was inspired by some similar112
results presented before by Conitzer and Sandholm [11] (and even earlier in [19]) for mixed113
Nash equilibria in general (normal-form) games. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is114
the first to study these questions for pure equilibria in the context of congestion games. It is115
of interest to also note here that our hardness gadget is gap-introducing, in the sense that116
the α-PNE and exact PNE of the game coincide.117
In Section 5 we demonstrate how one can combine the hardness gadget of Section 4, in a118
black-box way, with any nonexistence instance for α-PNE, in order to derive hardness for the119
decision version of the existence of α-PNE (Lemma 4, Theorem 5). As a consequence, using the120
previous Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
lower bound construction of Section 3, we can show that deciding whether121
a (weighted) polynomial congestion has an α-PNE is NP-hard, for any α < α(d), where122
α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
(Corollary 6). Since our hardness is established via a rather transparent,123
“master” reduction from Circuit Satisfiability, which in particular is parsimonious, one124
can derive hardness for a family of related computation problems; for example, we show125
that computing the number of α-approximate equilibria of a weighted polynomial congestion126
game is #P-hard (Corollary 7).127
In Section 6 we drop the assumption on polynomial cost functions, and study the existence128
of approximate equilibria under arbitrary (nondecreasing) latencies as a function of the129
number of players n. We prove that n-player congestion games always have n-approximate130
PNE (Theorem 8). As a consequence, one cannot hope to derive super-constant nonexistence131
lower bounds by using just simple instances with a fixed number of players (similar to, e.g.,132
Hansknecht et al. [21]). In particular, this shows that the super-constant number of players133
ICALP 2020
32:4 Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
in our construction in Theorem 1 is necessary. Furthermore, we pair this positive result134
with an almost matching lower bound (Theorem 9): we give examples of n-player congestion135
games (where latencies are simple step functions with a single breakpoint) that do not have136
α-PNE for all α < α(n), where α(n) grows according to α(n) = Ω
(
n
lnn
)
. Finally, inspired137
by our hardness construction for the polynomial case, we also give a new reduction that138
establishes NP-hardness for deciding whether an α-PNE exists, for any α < α(n) = Ω
(
n
lnn
)
.139
Notice that now the number of players n is part of the description of the game (i.e., part of140
the input) as opposed to the maximum degree d for the polynomial case (which was assumed141
to be fixed). On the other hand though, we have more flexibility on designing our gadget142
latencies, since they can be arbitrary functions.143
Concluding, we would like to elaborate on a couple of points. First, the reader would144
have already noticed that in all our hardness results the (in)approximability parameter α145
ranges freely within an entire interval of the form [1, α˜), where α˜ is a function of the degree d146
(for polynomial congestion games) or of the number of players n; and that α, α˜ are not part147
of the problem’s input. It is easy to see that these features only make our results stronger,148
with respect to computational hardness, but also more robust. Secondly, although in this149
introductory section all our hardness results were presented in terms of NP-hardness, they150
immediately translate to NP-completeness under standard assumptions on the parameter α;151
e.g., if α is rational (for a more detailed discussion of this, see also the end of Section 2).152
Due to space constraints we had to either fully omit, or just give very short sketches of,153
the proofs of our results. All proofs can be found in the full version of this paper [8].154
2 Model and Notation155
A (weighted, atomic) congestion game is defined by: a finite (nonempty) set of resources156
E, each e ∈ E having a nondecreasing cost (or latency) function ce : R>0 −→ R≥0; and a157
finite (nonempty) set of players N , |N | = n, each i ∈ N having a weight wi > 0 and a set158
of strategies Si ⊆ 2E . If all players have the same weight, wi = 1 for all i ∈ N , the game is159
called unweighted. A polynomial congestion game of degree d, for d a nonnegative integer, is160
a congestion game such that all its cost functions are polynomials of degree at most d with161
nonnegative coefficients.162
A strategy profile (or outcome) s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a collection of strategies, one for163
each player, i.e. s ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn. Each strategy profile s induces a cost of164
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si ce(xe(s)) to every player i ∈ N , where xe(s) =
∑
i:e∈si wi is the induced load165
on resource e. An outcome s will be called α-approximate (pure Nash) equilibrium (α-PNE),166
where α ≥ 1, if no player can unilaterally improve her cost by more than a factor of α.167
Formally:168
Ci(s) ≤ α · Ci(s′i, s−i) for all i ∈ N and all s′i ∈ Si. (1)169
Here we have used the standard game-theoretic notation of s−i to denote the vector of170
strategies resulting from s if we remove its i-th coordinate; in that way, one can write171
s = (si, s−i). Notice that for the special case of α = 1, (1) is equivalent to the classical172
definition of pure Nash equilibria; for emphasis, we will sometimes refer to such 1-PNE as173
exact equilibria.174
If (1) does not hold, it means that player i could improve her cost by more than α by175
moving from si to some other strategy s′i. We call such a move α-improving. Finally, strategy176
si is said to be α-dominating for player i (with respect to a fixed profile s−i) if177
Ci(s′i, s−i) > α · Ci(s) for all s′i 6= si. (2)178
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In other words, if a strategy si is α-dominating, every move from some other strategy s′i to179
si is α-improving. Notice that each player i can have at most one α-dominating strategy180
(for s−i fixed). In our proofs, we will employ a gap-introducing technique by constructing181
games with the property that, for any player i and any strategy profile s−i, there is always a182
(unique) α-dominating strategy for player i. As a consequence, the sets of α-PNE and exact183
PNE coincide.184
Finally, for a positive integer n, we will use Φn to denote the unique positive solution185
of equation (x + 1)n = xn+1. Then, Φn is strictly increasing with respect to n, with186
Φ1 = φ ≈ 1.618 (golden ratio) and asymptotically Φn ∼ nlnn (see [9, Lemma A.3]).187
Computational Complexity188
Most of the results in this paper involve complexity questions, regarding the existence189
of (approximate) equilibria. Whenever we deal with such statements, we will implicitly190
assume that the congestion game instances given as inputs to our problems can be succinctly191
represented in the following way:192
all player have rational weights;193
the resource cost functions are “efficiently computable”; for polynomial latencies in194
particular, we will assume that the coefficients are rationals; and for step functions we195
assume that their values and breakpoints are rationals;196
the strategy sets are given explicitly.2197
There are also computational considerations to be made about the number α appearing198
in the definition of α-PNE. For simplicity, throughout this paper we will assume that α is a199
rational number. However, all our hardness results are still valid for any real α, while for our200
completeness results one needs to assume that α is actually a polynomial-time computable201
real. For more details we refer to the full version of our paper [8].202
3 The Nonexistence Gadget203
In this section we give examples of polynomial congestion games of degree d, that do not have204
α(d)-approximate equilibria; α(d) grows as Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. Fixing a degree d ≥ 2, we construct205
a family of games Gd(n,k,w,β), specified by parameters n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], and206
β ∈ [0, 1]. In Gd(n,k,w,β) there are n+ 1 players: a heavy player of weight 1 and n light players207
1, . . . , n of equal weights w. There are 2(n+ 1) resources a0, a1, . . . , an, b0, b1, . . . , bn where208
a0 and b0 have the same cost function c0 and all other resources a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn have209
the same cost function c1 given by210
c0(x) = xk and c1(x) = βxd.211
Each player has exactly two strategies, and the strategy sets are given by212
S0 = {{a0, . . . , an}, {b0, . . . , bn}} and Si = {{a0, bi}, {b0, ai}} for i = 1, . . . , n.213
The structure of the strategies is visualized in Figure 1.214
2 Alternatively, we could have simply assumed succinct representability of the strategies. A prominent
such case is that of network congestion games, where each player’s strategies are all feasible paths
between two specific nodes of an underlying graph. Notice however that, since in this paper we are
proving hardness results, insisting on explicit representation only makes our results even stronger.
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a0 a1 · · · ai · · · an
bn · · · bi · · · b1 b0
Figure 1 Strategies of the game Gd(n,k,w,β). Resources contained in the two ellipses of the same
colour correspond to the two strategies of a player. The strategies of the heavy player and light
players n and i are depicted in black, grey and light grey, respectively.
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Figure 2 Nonexistence of α(d)-PNE for weighted polynomial congestion games of degree d, as
given by (3) in Theorem 1, for d = 2, 3, . . . , 100. In particular, for small values of d, α(2) ≈ 1.054,
α(3) ≈ 1.107 and α(4) ≈ 1.153.
In the following theorem we give a lower bound on α, depending on parameters (n, k, w, β),215
such that games Gd(n,k,w,β) do not admit an α-PNE. Maximizing this lower bound over all216
games in the family, we obtain a general lower bound α(d) on the inapproximability for217
polynomial congestion games of degree d (see (3) and its plot in Figure 2). Finally, choosing218
specific values for the parameters (n, k, w, β), we prove that α(d) is asymptotically lower219
bounded by Ω(
√
d
ln d ).220
I Theorem 1. For any integer d ≥ 2, there exist (weighted) polynomial congestion games of221
degree d that do not have α-approximate PNE for any α < α(d), where222
α(d) = sup
n,k,w,β
min
{
1 + nβ(1 + w)d
(1 + nw)k + nβ ,
(1 + w)k + βwd
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d
}
(3)223
s.t. n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1].224
225
In particular, we have the asymptotics α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
and the bound α(d) ≥
√
d
2 ln d , valid for226
large enough d. A plot of the exact values of α(d) (given by (3)) for small degrees can be227
found in Figure 2.228
Interestingly, for the special case of d = 2, 3, 4, the values of α(d) (see Figure 2) yield229
exactly the same lower bounds with Hansknecht et al. [21]. This is a direct consequence of230
the fact that n = 1 turns out to be an optimal choice in (3) for d ≤ 4, corresponding to an231
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g5
x1
g4
x2
g3 g2
g1
inputs C output
(a) valid circuit C
g5
x1
1
g4
x2
1
g3 g2
1 g1
(b) canonical form of C
1
x1
x2
g5
g4
g3 g2
g1
(c) directed acyclic graph
Figure 3 Example of a valid circuit C (having both NOT and NAND gates), its canonical form
(having only NAND gates), and the directed acyclic graph corresponding to C.
instance with only n+1 = 2 players (which is the regime of the construction in [21]); however,232
this is not the case for larger values of d, where more players are now needed in order to233
derive the best possible value in (3). Furthermore, as we discussed also in Section 1.2, no234
construction with only 2 players can result in bounds larger than 2 (Theorem 8).235
4 The Hardness Gadget236
In this section we construct an unweighted polynomial congestion game from a Boolean237
circuit. In the α-PNE of this game the players emulate the computation of the circuit. This238
gadget will be used in reductions from Circuit Satisfiability to show NP-hardness of239
several problems related to the existence of approximate equilibria with some additional240
properties. For example, deciding whether a congestion game has an α-PNE where a certain241
set of players choose a specific strategy profile (Theorem 3).242
Circuit Model243
We consider Boolean circuits consisting of NOT gates and 2-input NAND gates only. We244
assume that the two inputs to every NAND gate are different. Otherwise we replace the245
NAND gate by a NOT gate, without changing the semantics of the circuit. We further246
assume that every input bit is connected to exactly one gate and this gate is a NOT gate. See247
Figure 3a for a valid circuit. In a valid circuit we replace every NOT gate by an equivalent248
NAND gate, where one of the inputs is fixed to 1. See the replacement of gates g5, g4 and g2249
in the example in Figure 3b. Thus, we look at circuits of 2-input NAND gates where both250
inputs to a NAND gate are different and every input bit of the circuit is connected to exactly251
one NAND gate where the other input is fixed to 1. A circuit of this form is said to be in252
canonical form. For a circuit C and a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n we denote by C(x) the output of253
the circuit on input x.254
We model a circuit C in canonical form as a directed acyclic graph. The nodes of this255
graph correspond to the input bits x1, . . . , xn, the gates g1, . . . , gK and a node 1 for all256
fixed inputs. There is an arc from a gate g to a gate g′ if the output of g is input to257
gate g′ and there are arcs from the fixed input and all input bits to the connected gates.258
We index the gates in reverse topological order, so that all successors of a gate gk have a259
smaller index and the output of gate g1 is the output of the circuit. Denote by δ+(v) the260
set of the direct successors of node v. Then we have |δ+(xi)| = 1 for all input bits xi and261
δ+(gk) ⊆ {gk′ | k′ < k} for every gate gk. See Figure 3 for an example of a valid circuit, its262
canonical form and the corresponding directed acyclic graph.263
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Translation to Congestion Game264
Fix some integer d ≥ 1 and a parameter µ ≥ 1 + 2 · 3d+d/2. From a valid circuit in canonical265
form with input bits x1, . . . , xn, gates g1, . . . , gK and the extra input fixed to 1, we construct266
a polynomial congestion game Gdµ of degree d. There are n input players X1, . . . , Xn for267
every input bit, a static player P for the input fixed to 1, and K gate players G1, . . . , GK268
for the output bit of every gate. G1 is sometimes called output player as g1 corresponds to269
the output C(x).270
The idea is that every input and every gate player has a zero and a one strategy,271
corresponding to the respective bit being 0 or 1. In every α-PNE we want the players to272
emulate the computation of the circuit, i.e. the NAND semantics of the gates should be273
respected. For every gate gk, we introduce two resources 0k and 1k. The zero (one) strategy274
of a player consists of the 0k′ (1k′) resources of the direct successors in the directed acyclic275
graph corresponding to the circuit and its own 0k (1k) resource (for gate players). The static276
player has only one strategy playing all 1k resources of the gates where one input is fixed to277
1: sP = {1k | gk ∈ δ+(1)}. Formally, we have278
s0Xi =
{
0k | gk ∈ δ+(xi)
}
and s1Xi =
{
1k | gk ∈ δ+(xi)
}
279
for the zero and one strategy of an input player Xi. Recall that δ+(xi) is the set of direct280
successors of xi, thus every strategy of an input player consists of exactly one resource. For281
a gate player Gk we have the two strategies282
s0Gk = {0k} ∪
{
0k′ | gk′ ∈ δ+(gk)
}
and s1Gk = {1k} ∪
{
1k′ | gk′ ∈ δ+(gk)
}
283
consisting of at most k resources each. Notice that all 3 players related to a gate gk (gate284
player Gk and the two players corresponding to the input bits) are different and observe that285
every resource 0k and 1k can be played by exactly those 3 players.286
We define the cost functions of the resources using parameter µ. The cost functions for287
resources 1k are given by c1k and for resources 0k by c0k , where288
c1k(x) = µkxd and c0k(x) = λµkxd, with λ = 3
d/2. (4)289
Our construction here is inspired by the lockable circuit games of Skopalik and Vöcking [34].290
The key technical differences are that our gadgets use polynomial cost functions (instead of291
general cost functions) and only 2 resources per gate (instead of 3). Moreover, while in [34]292
these games are used as part of a PLS-reduction from Circuit/FLIP, we are also interested293
in constructing a gadget to be studied on its own, since this can give rise to additional results294
of independent interest (see Theorem 3).295
Properties of the Gadget296
For a valid circuit C in canonical form consider the game Gdµ as defined above. We interpret297
any strategy profile s of the input players as a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n by setting xi = 0 if298
sXi = s0Xi and xi = 1 otherwise. The gate players are said to follow the NAND semantics in299
a strategy profile, if for every gate gk the following holds:300
if both players corresponding to the input bits of gk play their one strategy, then the gate301
player Gk plays her zero strategy;302
if at least one of the players corresponding to the input bits of gk plays her zero strategy,303
then the gate player Gk plays her one strategy.304
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We show that for the right choice of α, the set of α-PNE in Gdµ is the same as the set of all305
strategy profiles where the gate players follow the NAND semantics.306
Define307
ε(µ) = 3
d+d/2
µ− 1 . (5)308
From our choice of µ, we obtain 3d/2 − ε(µ) ≥ 3d/2 − 12 > 1. For any valid circuit C in309
canonical form and a valid choice of µ the following lemma holds for Gdµ.310
I Lemma 2. Let sX be any strategy profile for the input players X1, . . . , Xn and let x ∈311
{0, 1}n be the bit vector represented by sX . For any µ ≥ 1 + 2 · 3d+d/2 and any 1 ≤ α <312
3d/2−ε(µ), there is a unique α-approximate PNE3 in Gdµ where the input players play according313
to sX . In particular, in this α-PNE the gate players follow the NAND semantics, and the314
output player G1 plays according to C(x).315
Proof sketch. We first fix the input players to the strategies given by sX and show that316
then all gate players follow the NAND semantics (switching to the strategy corresponding to317
the NAND of their input bits is an α-improving move). Secondly, we argue that the input318
players have no incentive to change their strategy in any α-PNE where all gate players follow319
the NAND semantics. Hence, every strategy profile for the input players can be extended to320
an α-PNE in Gdµ that is uniquely defined by the NAND semantics. J321
We are now ready to show our main result of this section; using the circuit game described322
above, we show NP-hardness of deciding whether approximate equilibria with additional323
properties exist.324
I Theorem 3. The following problems are NP-hard, even for unweighted polynomial con-325
gestion games of degree d ≥ 1, for all α ∈ [1, 3d/2) and all z > 0:326
“Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain subset of players are playing327
a specific strategy profile?”328
“Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain resource is used by at least329
one player?”330
“Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain player has cost at most z?”331
Proof sketch. We use reductions from the NP-hard problem Circuit Satisfiability. For332
a circuit C we consider the game Gdµ as described above and focus on the output player G1.333
Using Lemma 2 we get a one-to-one correspondence between satisfying assignments for C334
and α-PNE in Gdµ where G1 plays her one strategy. J335
5 Hardness of Existence336
In this section we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial congestion game337
has an α-PNE. For this we use a black-box reduction: our hard instance is obtained by338
combining any (weighted) polynomial congestion game G without α-PNE (i.e., the game339
from Section 3) with the circuit gadget of the previous section. To achieve this, it would be340
convenient to make some assumptions on the game G, which however do not influence the341
existence or nonexistence of approximate equilibria.342
3 Which, as a matter of fact, is actually also an exact PNE.
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Structural Properties of G343
Without loss of generality, we assume that a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree344
d has the following structural properties.345
No player has an empty strategy. If, for some player i, ∅ ∈ Si, then this strategy would346
be α-dominating for i. Removing i from the game description would not affect the347
(non)existence of (approximate) equilibria4.348
No player has zero weight. If a player i had zero weight, her strategy would not influence349
the costs of the strategies of the other players. Again, removing i from the game description350
would not affect the (non)existence of equilibria.351
Each resource e has a monomial cost function with a strictly positive coefficient, i.e.352
ce(x) = aexke where ae > 0 and ke ∈ {0, . . . , d}. If a resource had a more general cost353
function ce(x) = ae,0 + ae,1x+ . . .+ ae,dxd, we could split it into at most d+ 1 resources354
with (positive) monomial costs, ce,0(x) = ae,0, ce,1(x) = ae,1x, . . . , ce,d(x) = ae,dxd.355
These monomial cost resources replace the original resource, appearing on every strategy356
that included e.357
No resource e has a constant cost function. If a resource e had a constant cost function358
ce(x) = ae,0, we could replace it by new resources having monomial cost. For each player359
i of weight wi, replace resource e by a resource ei with monomial cost cei(x) =
ae,0
wi
x, that360
is used exclusively by player i on her strategies that originally had resource e. Note that361
cei(wi) = ae,0, so that this modification does not change the player’s costs, neither has362
an effect on the (non)existence of approximate equilibria. If a resource has cost function363
constantly equal to zero, we can simply remove it from the description of the game.364
For a game having the above properties, we define the (strictly positive) quantities365
amin = min
e∈E
ae, W =
∑
i∈N
wi, cmax =
∑
e∈E
ce(W ). (6)366
Note that cmax is an upper bound on the cost of any player on any strategy profile.367
Rescaling of G368
In our construction of the combined game we have to make sure that the weights of the369
players in G are smaller than the weights of the players in the circuit gadget. We introduce370
the following rescaling argument.371
For any γ ∈ (0, 1] define the game G˜γ , where we rescale the player weights and resource372
cost coefficients in G as373
a˜e = γd+1−keae, w˜i = γwi, c˜e(x) = a˜exke . (7)374
This changes the quantities in (6) for G˜γ to (recall that ke ≥ 1)375
a˜min = min
e∈E
a˜e = min
e∈E
γd+1−keae ≥ γd min
e∈E
ae = γdamin,376
W˜ =
∑
i∈N
w˜i =
∑
i∈N
γwi = γW,377
c˜max =
∑
e∈E
c˜e(W˜ ) =
∑
e∈E
a˜e(γW )ke =
∑
e∈E
γd+1aeW
ke = γd+1
∑
e∈E
ce(W ) = γd+1cmax.378
379
4 By this we mean, if G has (resp. does not have) α-PNE, then G˜, obtained by removing player i from the
game, still has (resp. still does not have) α-PNE.
G. Christodoulou, M. Gairing, Y. Giannakopoulos, D. Poças, and C. Waldmann 32:11
1
X1
...
Xn
G1
Gdµ
01
11
• •
• •
G˜γ
i j
dummy
Figure 4 Combination of a circuit game (on the left) and a game without approximate equilibria
(on the right). Changes to the subgames are indicated by solid arrows. The new one strategy of G1
consists of 11 and all resources in G˜γ , while the zero strategy stays unchanged. The players of G˜γ
get a new strategy (the dummy resource), and keep their old strategies playing in G˜γ .
In G˜γ the player costs are all uniformly scaled as C˜i(s) = γd+1Ci(s), so that the Nash380
dynamics and the (non)existence of equilibria are preserved.381
The next lemma formalizes the combination of both game gadgets and, furthermore,382
establishes the gap-introduction in the equilibrium factor. Using it, we will derive our key383
hardness tool of Theorem 5.384
I Lemma 4. Fix any integer d ≥ 2 and rational α ≥ 1. Suppose there exists a weighted385
polynomial congestion game G of degree d that does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then,386
for any circuit C there exists a game G˜C with the following property: the sets of α-approximate387
PNE and exact PNE of G˜C coincide and are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of388
satisfying assignments of C. In particular, one of the following holds: either389
1. C has a satisfying assignment, in which case G˜C has an exact PNE (and thus, also an390
α-approximate PNE); or391
2. C has no satisfying assignments, in which case G˜C has no α-approximate PNE (and thus,392
also no exact PNE).393
Proof. Let G be a congestion game as in the statement of the theorem having the above394
mentioned structural properties. Recalling that weighted polynomial congestion games of395
degree d have d-PNE [3], this implies that α < d < 3d/2. Fix some 0 < ε < 3d/2 − α and take396
µ ≥ 1 + 3d+d/2min{ε,1} ; in this way α < 3d/2 − ε ≤ 3d/2 − ε(µ).397
Given a circuit C we construct the game G˜C as follows. We combine the game Gdµ whose398
Nash dynamics model the NAND semantics of C, as described in Section 4, with the game399
G˜γ obtained from G via the aforementioned rescaling. We choose γ ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small400
such that the following three inequalities hold for the quantities in (6) for G:401
γW < 1, γ
∑
e∈E
ae <
µ
µ− 1
(
3
2
)d
, γα2 <
amin
cmax
. (8)402
Thus, the set of players in G˜C corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the static, input and403
gate players in Gdµ (which all have weights 1) and the players in G˜γ (with weights w˜i). We404
also consider a new dummy resource with constant cost cdummy(x) = a˜minα . Thus, the set of405
resources corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the gate resources 0k, 1k in Gdµ, the resources406
in G˜γ , and the dummy resource. We augment the strategy space of the players as follows:407
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each input player or gate player of Gdµ that is not the output player G1 has the same408
strategies as in Gdµ (i.e. either the zero or the one strategy);409
the zero strategy of the output player G1 is the same as in Gdµ, but her one strategy is410
augmented with every resource in G˜γ ; that is, s1G1 = {11} ∪ E(G˜γ);411
each player i in G˜γ keeps her original strategies as in G˜γ , and gets a new dummy strategy412
si,dummy = {dummy}.413
A graphical representation of the game G˜C can be seen in Figure 4.414
To finish the proof, we need to show that every α-PNE of G˜C is an exact PNE and415
corresponds to a satisfying assignment of C; and, conversely, that every satisfying assignment416
of C gives rise to an exact PNE of G˜C (and thus, an α-PNE as well).417
Suppose that s is an α-PNE of G˜C , and let sX denote the strategy profile restricted to418
the input players of Gdµ. Then, as in the proof of Lemma 2, every gate player that is not the419
output player must respect the NAND semantics, and this is an α-dominating strategy. For420
the output player, either sX is a non-satisfying assignment, in which case the zero strategy421
of G1 was α-dominating, and this remains α-dominating in the game G˜C (since only the cost422
of the one strategy increased for the output player); or sX is a satisfying assignment. In the423
second case, we now argue that the one strategy of G1 remains α-dominating. The cost of424
the output player on the zero strategy is at least c01(2) = λµ2d, and the cost on the one425
strategy is at most426
c11(2)+
∑
e∈E
c˜e(1+γW ) = µ2d+
∑
e∈E
γd+1−keae(1+γW )ke < µ2d+γ
∑
e∈E
ae2d < µ2d+
µ
µ− 13
d,427
where we used the first and second bounds from (8). Thus, the ratio between the costs is at428
least429
λµ2d
µ2d + µµ−13d
= λ
 1
1 + 1µ−1
( 3
2
)d
 > 3d/2( 1
1 + 1µ−13d
)
> 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α.430
Given that the gate players must follow the NAND semantics, the input players are also431
locked to their strategies (i.e. they have no incentive to change) due to the proof of Lemma 2.432
The only players left to consider are the players from G˜γ . First we show that, since s is an433
α-PNE, the output player must be playing her one strategy. If this was not the case, then434
each dummy strategy of a player in G˜γ is α-dominated by any other strategy: the dummy435
strategy incurs a cost of a˜minα ≥ γd aminα , whereas any other strategy would give a cost of at436
most c˜max = γd+1cmax (this is because the output player is not playing any of the resources437
in G˜γ). The ratio between the costs is thus at least438
γdamin
γd+1cmaxα
= amin
γcmaxα
> α.439
Since the dummy strategies are α-dominated, the players in G˜γ must be playing on their440
original sets of strategies. The only way for s to be an α-PNE would be if G had an α-PNE441
to begin with, which yields a contradiction. Thus, the output player is playing the one442
strategy (and hence, is present in every resource in G˜γ). In such a case, we can conclude443
that each dummy strategy is now α-dominating. If a player i in G˜γ is not playing a dummy444
strategy, she is playing at least one resource in G˜γ , say resource e. Her cost is at least445
c˜e(1 + w˜i) = a˜e(1 + w˜i)ke > a˜e ≥ a˜min (the strict inequality holds since, by the structural446
properties of our game, all of a˜e, w˜i and ke are strictly positive quantities). On the other447
hand, the cost of playing the dummy strategy is a˜minα . Thus, the ratio between the costs is448
greater than α.449
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We have concluded that, if s is an α-PNE of G˜C , then sX corresponds to a satisfying450
assignment of C, all the gate players are playing according to the NAND semantics, the output451
player is playing the one strategy, and all players of G˜γ are playing the dummy strategies. In452
this case, we also have observed that each player’s current strategy is α-dominating, so the453
strategy profile is an exact PNE. To finish the proof, we need to argue that every satisfying454
assignment gives rise to a unique α-PNE. Let sX be the strategy profile corresponding to this455
assignment for the input players in Gdµ. Then, as before, there is one and exactly one α-PNE456
s in G˜C that agrees with sX ; namely, each gate player follows the NAND semantics, the457
output player plays the one strategy, and the players in G˜γ play the dummy strategies. J458
By approximating all numbers occurring in the construction of Lemma 4 (weights,459
coefficients, approximation factor) by rationals, we obtain a polynomial-time reduction from460
Circuit Satisfiability, and thus the following theorem.461
I Theorem 5. For any integer d ≥ 2 and rational α ≥ 1, suppose there exists a weighted462
polynomial congestion game which does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then it is NP-463
complete to decide whether (weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d have an464
α-approximate PNE.465
Proof. Let d ≥ 2 and α ≥ 1. Let G be a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree466
d that has no α-PNE; this means that for every strategy profile s there exists a player i467
and a strategy s′i 6= si such that Ci(si, s−i) > α · Ci(s′i, s−i). Note that the functions Ci are468
polynomials of degree d and hence they are continuous on the weights wi and the coefficients469
ae appearing on the cost functions. Hence, any arbitrarily small perturbation of the wi, ae470
does not change the sign of the above inequality. Thus, without loss of generality, we can471
assume that all wi, ae are rational numbers.472
Next, we consider the game G˜γ obtained from G by rescaling, as in the proof of Lemma 4.473
Notice that the rescaling is done via the choice of a sufficiently small γ, according to (8),474
and hence in particular we can take γ to be a sufficiently small rational. In this way, all475
the player weights and coefficients in the cost of resources are rational numbers scaled by a476
rational number and hence rationals.477
Finally, we are able to provide the desired NP reduction from Circuit Satisfiability.478
Given a Boolean circuit C ′ built with 2-input NAND gates, transform it into a valid circuit479
C in canonical form. From C we can construct in polynomial time the game G˜C as described480
in the proof of Lemma 4. The ‘circuit part’, i.e. the game Gdµ, is obtained in polynomial481
time from C, as in the proof of Theorem 3; the description of the game G˜γ involves only482
rational numbers, and hence the game can be represented by a constant number of bits (i.e.483
independent of the circuit C). Similarly, the additional dummy strategy has a constant delay484
of a˜min/α, and can be represented with a single rational number. Merging both Gdµ and G˜γ485
into a single game G˜C can be done in linear time. Since C has a satisfying assignment iff G˜C486
has an α-PNE (or α-PNE), this concludes that the problem described is NP-hard.487
The problem is clearly in NP: given a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d488
and a strategy profile s, one can check if s is an α-PNE by computing the ratios between the489
cost of each player in s and their cost for each possible deviation, and comparing these ratios490
with α. J491
Combining the hardness result of Theorem 5 together with the nonexistence result of492
Theorem 1 we get the following corollary, which is the main result of this section.493
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I Corollary 6. For any integer d ≥ 2 and rational α ∈ [1, α(d)), it is NP-complete to decide494
whether (weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d have an α-approximate PNE,495
where α(d) = Ω˜(
√
d) is the same as in Theorem 1.496
Notice that, in the proof of Lemma 4 and Theorem 5, we constructed a polynomial-time497
reduction from Circuit Satisfiability to the problem of determining whether a given498
congestion game has an α-PNE. Not only does this reduction map YES-instances of one499
problem to YES-instances of the other, but it also induces a bijection between the sets of500
satisfying assignments of a circuit C and α-PNE of the corresponding game G˜C . That is,501
this reduction is parsimonious. As a consequence, we can directly lift hardness of problems502
associated with counting satisfying assignments to Circuit Satisfiability into problems503
associated with counting equilibria in congestion games:504
I Corollary 7. Let k ≥ 1 and d ≥ 2 be integers and α ∈ [1, α(d)) where α(d) = Ω˜(√d) is the505
same as in Theorem 1. Then506
it is #P-hard to count the number of α-approximate PNE of (weighted) polynomial507
congestion games of degree d;508
it is NP-hard to decide whether a (weighted) polynomial congestion game of degree d has509
at least k distinct α-approximate PNE.510
Proof. The hardness of the first problem comes from the #P-hardness of the counting version511
of Circuit Satisfiability (see, e.g., [29, Ch. 18]). For the hardness of the second problem,512
it is immediate to see that the following problem is NP-complete, for any fixed integer k ≥ 1:513
given a circuit C, decide whether there are at least k distinct satisfying assignments for C514
(simply add “dummy” variables to the description of the circuit). J515
6 General Cost Functions516
In this final section we leave the domain of polynomial latencies and study the existence of517
approximate equilibria in general congestion games having arbitrary (nondecreasing) cost518
functions. Our parameter of interest, with respect to which both our positive and negative519
results are going to be stated, is the number of players n. We start by showing that n-PNE520
always exist:521
I Theorem 8. Every weighted congestion game with n players and arbitrary (nondecreasing)522
cost functions has an n-approximate PNE.523
Proof. Fix a weighted congestion game with n ≥ 2 players, some strategy profile s, and a524
possible deviation s′i of player i. First notice that we can write the change in the cost of any525
other player j 6= i as526
Cj(s′i, s−i)− Cj(s) =
∑
e∈sj
ce(xe(s′i, s−i))−
∑
e∈sj
ce(xe(s))527
=
∑
e∈sj∩(s′i\si)
[ce(xe(s′i, s−i))− ce(xe(s))]528
+
∑
e∈sj∩(si\s′i)
[ce(xe(s′i, s−i))− ce(xe(s))] (9)529
530
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Furthermore, we can upper bound this by531
Cj(s′i, s−i)− Cj(s) ≤
∑
e∈sj∩(s′i\si)
[ce(xe(s′i, s−i))− ce(xe(s))]532
≤
∑
e∈s′
i
ce(xe(s′i, s−i))533
= Ci(s′i, s−i), (10)534535
the first inequality holding due to the fact that the second sum in (9) contains only nonpositive536
terms (since the latency functions are nondecreasing).537
Next, define the social cost C(s) =
∑
i∈N Ci(s). Adding the above inequality over all538
players j 6= i (of which there are n− 1) and rearranging, we successively derive:539 ∑
j 6=i
Cj(s′i, s−i)−
∑
j 6=i
Cj(s) ≤ (n− 1)Ci(s′i, s−i)540
(C(s′i, s−i)− Ci(s′i, s−i))− (C(s)− Ci(s)) ≤ (n− 1)Ci(s′i, s−i)541
C(s′i, s−i)− C(s) ≤ nCi(s′i, s−i)− Ci(s). (11)542543
We conclude that, if s′i is an n-improving deviation for player i (i.e., nCi(s′i, s−i) < Ci(s)), then544
the social cost must strictly decrease after this move. Thus, any (global or local) minimizer545
of the social cost must be an n-PNE (the existence of such a minimizer is guaranteed by the546
fact that the strategy spaces are finite). J547
The proof not only establishes the existence of n-approximate equilibria in general548
congestion games, but also highlights a few additional interesting features. First, due549
to the key inequality (11), n-PNE are reachable via sequences of n-improving moves, in550
addition to arising also as minimizers of the social cost function. These attributes give a551
nice “constructive” flavour to Theorem 8. Secondly, exactly because social cost optima are552
n-PNE, the Price of Stability5 of n-PNE is optimal (i.e., equal to 1) as well. Another, more553
succinct way, to interpret these observations is within the context of approximate potentials554
(see, e.g., [6, 10, 9]); (11) establishes that the social cost itself is always an n-approximate555
potential of any congestion game.556
Next, we design a family of games Gn that do not admit Θ
(
n
lnn
)
-PNE, thus nearly557
matching the upper bound Theorem 8. In the game Gn there are n = m + 1 play-558
ers 0, 1, . . . ,m, where player i has weight wi = 1/2i. In particular, this means that for559
any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: ∑mk=i wk < wi−1 ≤ w0. Furthermore, there are 2(m + 1) resources560
a0, a1, . . . , am, b0, b1, . . . , bm, where resources ai and bi have the same cost function ci given561
by562
ca0(x) = cb0(x) = c0(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ w0,
0, otherwise;
563
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},564
cai(x) = cbi(x) = ci(x) =
 1ξ
(
1 + 1ξ
)i−1
, if x ≥ w0 + wi,
0, otherwise.
565
5 The Price of Stability (PoS) is a well-established and extensively studied notion in algorithmic game
theory, originally studied in [2, 12]. It captures the minimum approximation ratio of the social cost
between equilibria and the optimal solution (see, e.g., [7, 9]); in other words, it is the best-case analogue
of the the Price of Anarchy (PoA) notion of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [25].
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Where ξ = Φn−1 is the positive solution of (x+ 1)n−1 = xn.566
The strategy set of player 0 and of all players i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are, respectively,567
S0 = {{a0, . . . , am}, {b0, . . . , bm}}, and Si = {{a0, . . . , ai−1, bi}, {b0, . . . , bi−1, ai}}.568
Analysing the costs of strategy profiles in Gn (see [8]) we get the following theorem.569
I Theorem 9. For any integer n ≥ 2, there exist weighted congestion games with n players570
and general cost functions that do not have α-approximate PNE for any α < Φn−1, where571
Φm ∼ mlnm is the unique positive solution of (x+ 1)m = xm+1.572
Similar to the spirit of the rest of our paper so far, we’d like to show an NP-hardness573
result for deciding existence of α-PNE for general games as well. We do exactly that in574
the following theorem, where now α grows as Θ˜(n). Again, we use the circuit gadget and575
combine it with the game from the previous nonexistence Theorem 9. The main difference576
to the previous reductions is that now n is part of the input. On the other hand we are not577
restricted to polynomial latencies, so we use step functions having a single breakpoint.578
I Theorem 10. Let ε > 0, and let α˜ : N≥2 −→ Q be any (polynomial-time computable)579
sequence such that 1 ≤ α˜(n) < Φn−11+ε = Θ˜(n), where Φm ∼ mlnm is the unique positive solution580
of (x + 1)m = xm+1. Then, it is NP-complete to decide whether a (weighted) congestion581
game with n players has an α˜(n)-approximate PNE.582
7 Discussion and Future Directions583
In this paper we showed that weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of degree584
d do not have α-PNE for α < α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. For general cost functions, we proved that585
n-PNE always exist whereas α-PNE in general do not, where n is the number of players and586
α < Φn−1 = Θ
(
n
lnn
)
. We also transformed the nonexistence results into complexity-theoretic587
results, establishing that deciding whether such α-PNE exist is itself an NP-hard problem.588
We now identify two possible directions for follow-up work. A first obvious question would589
be to reduce the nonexistence gap between Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
(derived in Theorem 1 of this paper)590
and d (shown in [3]) for polynomials of degree d; similarly for the gap between Θ
(
n
lnn
)
591
(Theorem 9) and n (Theorem 8) for general cost functions and n players. Notice that all592
current methods for proving upper bounds (i.e., existence) are essentially based on potential593
function arguments; thus it might be necessary to come up with novel ideas and techniques594
to overcome the current gaps.595
A second direction would be to study the complexity of finding α-PNE, when they are596
guaranteed to exist. For example, for polynomials of degree d, we know that d-improving597
dynamics eventually reach a d-PNE [3], and so finding such an approximate equilibrium lies598
in the complexity class PLS of local search problems (see, e.g., [24, 33]). However, from599
a complexity theory perspective the only known lower bound is the PLS-completeness of600
finding an exact equilibrium for unweighted congestion games [14] (and this is true even for601
d = 1, i.e., affine cost functions; see [1]). On the other hand, we know that dO(d)-PNE can602
be computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., [5, 18, 15]). It would be then very interesting to603
establish a “gradation” in complexity (e.g., from NP-hardness to PLS-hardness to P) as the604
parameter α increases from 1 to dO(d).605
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